InkNote/e2e/fakeIdp.mjs

/*
 * A provider to sign in at, for the OIDC suite.
 *
 * Small on purpose: discovery, an authorize page with two buttons, the token
 * exchange, and a key set. It is a real OpenID Connect provider in the only
 * sense that matters here — it signs a real RS256 ID token with a real key that
 * InkNote fetches and checks, so the suite exercises the verification rather
 * than stepping around it.
 *
 * It also does the things a provider should refuse, on request: sign with the
 * wrong key, or return a token addressed to somebody else. A check that the
 * good case works proves very little on its own.
 *
 * Bound to every interface, because two different machines talk to it: the
 * browser (in this container) and the InkNote server (in another one, reaching
 * it through the Docker host). Both must know it under the *same* name, or the
 * issuer in the token will not match — see run.sh and docker-compose.dev.yml.
 */
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import http from "node:http";

const b64url = (buf) => Buffer.from(buf).toString("base64url");
const ACCESS_TOKEN = "test-access-token";
const ONE_PIXEL_PNG = Buffer.from(
  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
  "base64"
);
const json = (res, body, status = 200) => {
  res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
  res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
};

/*
 * The key this provider signs with, written out rather than generated.
 *
 * InkNote caches a provider's keys for an hour and only goes back for them when
 * it meets a `kid` it does not know — which is right for a real provider, whose
 * key does not change between two test runs, and fatal for one that made a new
 * key every time: the second run of the day would be refused with a perfectly
 * correct "signature does not match".
 *
 * It is a test key for a test provider on a test port. It signs nothing that
 * exists outside this suite.
 */
const TEST_PRIVATE_KEY = `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----`;

export async function startFakeIdp({ port = 3011, issuer, clientId, clientSecret }) {
  const real = {
    privateKey: crypto.createPrivateKey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY),
    publicKey: crypto.createPublicKey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY),
  };
  const other = crypto.generateKeyPairSync("rsa", { modulusLength: 2048 }); // never published
  const kid = "test-key-1";

  /* Who the next sign-in is, and what the provider should do wrong this time.
     Set by the suite through POST /who before each attempt. */
  let identity = {
    sub: "subject-1",
    preferred_username: "someone",
    name: "Some One",
    picture: `${issuer}/picture.png`,
  };
  let misbehave = { wrongKey: false, wrongAudience: false };
  const codes = new Map(); // code -> { challenge, nonce, identity }

  const idToken = ({ nonce, sub, picture, ...rest }) => {
    // `picture` is deliberately left out of the token — it is offered at
    // /userinfo instead, which is what a lean provider does and what InkNote
    // used never to ask for.
    const key = misbehave.wrongKey ? other.privateKey : real.privateKey;
    const header = b64url(JSON.stringify({ alg: "RS256", typ: "JWT", kid }));
    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
    const payload = b64url(
      JSON.stringify({
        iss: issuer,
        sub,
        aud: misbehave.wrongAudience ? "somebody-else" : clientId,
        exp: now + 300,
        iat: now,
        nonce,
        ...rest,
      })
    );
    const signature = crypto.sign("sha256", Buffer.from(`${header}.${payload}`), key);
    return `${header}.${payload}.${b64url(signature)}`;
  };

  const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
    const url = new URL(req.url, issuer);

    if (url.pathname === "/.well-known/openid-configuration") {
      return json(res, {
        issuer,
        authorization_endpoint: `${issuer}/authorize`,
        token_endpoint: `${issuer}/token`,
        jwks_uri: `${issuer}/jwks`,
        userinfo_endpoint: `${issuer}/userinfo`,
        response_types_supported: ["code"],
        id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"],
      });
    }

    /* A picture to be somebody's face — one green pixel, blown up by the
       browser. The point is the journey, not the portrait. */
    if (url.pathname === "/picture.png") {
      // Behind the provider's own door, like a real one's: without the access
      // token there is nothing here.
      if (req.headers.authorization !== `Bearer ${ACCESS_TOKEN}`) {
        return json(res, { error: "unauthorized" }, 401);
      }
      res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "image/png" });
      return res.end(ONE_PIXEL_PNG);
    }

    /* The rest of what is known about somebody. A provider is free to keep the
       picture here rather than in the token, and several do. */
    if (url.pathname === "/userinfo") {
      if (req.headers.authorization !== `Bearer ${ACCESS_TOKEN}`) {
        return json(res, { error: "unauthorized" }, 401);
      }
      return json(res, { sub: identity.sub, ...(identity.picture ? { picture: identity.picture } : {}) });
    }

    if (url.pathname === "/jwks") {
      const jwk = real.publicKey.export({ format: "jwk" });
      return json(res, { keys: [{ ...jwk, kid, use: "sig", alg: "RS256" }] });
    }

    /* The suite says who is about to sign in, and how the provider should behave. */
    if (url.pathname === "/who" && req.method === "POST") {
      const body = await new Promise((resolve) => {
        let d = "";
        req.on("data", (c) => (d += c));
        req.on("end", () => resolve(JSON.parse(d || "{}")));
      });
      identity = { ...identity, ...(body.identity || {}) };
      misbehave = { wrongKey: false, wrongAudience: false, ...(body.misbehave || {}) };
      return json(res, { ok: true, identity, misbehave });
    }

    if (url.pathname === "/authorize") {
      const back = url.searchParams.get("redirect_uri");
      const state = url.searchParams.get("state");
      const code = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
      codes.set(code, {
        challenge: url.searchParams.get("code_challenge"),
        nonce: url.searchParams.get("nonce"),
        identity,
      });
      // A page with a button rather than an immediate redirect: this is where a
      // person types a password or taps a passkey, and the suite should have to
      // go through it like one.
      res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8" });
      return res.end(`<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Test IdP</title>
        <body style="font-family:sans-serif;padding:40px">
        <h1>Test identity provider</h1>
        <p>Signing in as <b>${identity.preferred_username}</b></p>
        <a data-idp-approve href="${back}?code=${code}&state=${encodeURIComponent(state)}">Approve</a>
        <a data-idp-deny href="${back}?error=access_denied&state=${encodeURIComponent(state)}">Deny</a>
        </body>`);
    }

    if (url.pathname === "/token" && req.method === "POST") {
      const body = await new Promise((resolve) => {
        let d = "";
        req.on("data", (c) => (d += c));
        req.on("end", () => resolve(new URLSearchParams(d)));
      });
      const entry = codes.get(body.get("code"));
      codes.delete(body.get("code")); // one exchange per code, like the real thing
      if (!entry) return json(res, { error: "invalid_grant" }, 400);
      if (body.get("client_secret") !== clientSecret) return json(res, { error: "invalid_client" }, 401);
      const verifier = body.get("code_verifier") || "";
      const computed = b64url(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest());
      if (computed !== entry.challenge) return json(res, { error: "invalid_grant" }, 400);

      return json(res, {
        access_token: ACCESS_TOKEN,
        token_type: "Bearer",
        expires_in: 300,
        id_token: idToken({ nonce: entry.nonce, ...entry.identity }),
      });
    }

    json(res, { error: "not_found" }, 404);
  });

  await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(port, "0.0.0.0", resolve));

  return {
    /** Sets who signs in next, and whether the provider misbehaves. */
    async setNext(body) {
      const r = await fetch(`${issuer}/who`, {
        method: "POST",
        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
        body: JSON.stringify(body),
      });
      return r.json();
    },
    async stop() {
      await new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));
    },
  };
}