/*
 * Signing in through an identity provider — OpenID Connect.
 * ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *
 * This is a second way to obtain the *same* token the password login hands out.
 * Nothing downstream changes: every route, and the WebSocket, still knows only
 * a signed JWT. That is the whole reason this fits in one file.
 *
 * Authorization Code with PKCE, and the code is exchanged **here**, never in
 * the browser: the client secret stays on the server, and the browser is only
 * ever handed a one-time ticket to swap for its token — a token in a redirect
 * URL ends up in the history, in the proxy's log, and in the referrer of the
 * next request.
 *
 * No library. Discovery is one document, the exchange is one form post, and
 * checking the ID token is a signature and five claims — Node imports a JWK
 * directly (`createPublicKey({ format: "jwk" })`), so this needs nothing that
 * is not already installed. A dependency here would be one more thing to keep
 * current in the part of the app that must not rot.
 *
 * What this file deliberately does *not* do:
 *   • refresh tokens — the provider is asked once, at sign-in, and InkNote's own
 *     token carries the session from then on. Nothing here needs the provider to
 *     be reachable afterwards, which is what keeps the app working offline.
 *   • decide who may in. That is an account question, and it is answered in
 *     server.js where the users are.
 */

const crypto = require("crypto");

/* ─── Configuration ─── */

const trimSlash = (s) => String(s || "").replace(/\/+$/, "");

const ISSUER = trimSlash(process.env.INKNOTE_OIDC_ISSUER);
const CLIENT_ID = process.env.INKNOTE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID || "";
const CLIENT_SECRET = process.env.INKNOTE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET || "";
const PUBLIC_URL = trimSlash(process.env.INKNOTE_PUBLIC_URL);
const REDIRECT_URI =
  process.env.INKNOTE_OIDC_REDIRECT_URI || (PUBLIC_URL ? `${PUBLIC_URL}/api/auth/oidc/callback` : "");
const SCOPES = process.env.INKNOTE_OIDC_SCOPES || "openid profile email";
const LABEL = process.env.INKNOTE_OIDC_LABEL || "single sign-on";

/* Where the browser is sent back to with its ticket. The redirect URI names the
 * API; the app itself sits at the root of the same site. Never anything read
 * off the request: a redirect built from a parameter is an open redirect, and
 * this one is reached without being signed in. */
const APP_URL = PUBLIC_URL || trimSlash(REDIRECT_URI).replace(/\/api\/auth\/oidc\/callback$/, "") || "";

const enabled = Boolean(ISSUER && CLIENT_ID && CLIENT_SECRET && REDIRECT_URI);

/** Says what is missing, once, at boot — half a configuration is a typo, not a choice. */
function describeConfiguration() {
  if (enabled) {
    // The client secret and the code both travel to the issuer. Over plain HTTP
    // they travel readably, which is worth saying out loud rather than assuming
    // somebody meant it.
    const insecure = ISSUER.startsWith("http://") ? "\n  ⚠️  …over plain HTTP: the client secret and the code are readable in transit" : "";
    return `  ✅ OpenID Connect enabled — ${ISSUER} (redirect ${REDIRECT_URI})${insecure}`;
  }
  const named = [
    ["INKNOTE_OIDC_ISSUER", ISSUER],
    ["INKNOTE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID", CLIENT_ID],
    ["INKNOTE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", CLIENT_SECRET],
    ["INKNOTE_PUBLIC_URL or INKNOTE_OIDC_REDIRECT_URI", REDIRECT_URI],
  ];
  if (named.every(([, v]) => !v)) return null; // not configured at all: nothing to say
  const missing = named.filter(([, v]) => !v).map(([n]) => n);
  return `  ⚠️  OpenID Connect is half configured and stays off — missing: ${missing.join(", ")}`;
}

/* ─── Small helpers ─── */

const b64url = (buf) => Buffer.from(buf).toString("base64url");
const randomId = () => crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");

/** Fails loudly with a short slug: the browser is told the slug, the log the rest. */
function fail(code, detail) {
  const err = new Error(detail ? `${code}: ${detail}` : code);
  err.code = code;
  return err;
}

async function getJson(url, options = {}) {
  const res = await fetch(url, { ...options, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(8000) });
  const text = await res.text();
  let body = null;
  try {
    body = JSON.parse(text);
  } catch {
    /* left null — reported below with the status, which is the useful half */
  }
  if (!res.ok || !body) throw fail("provider_unreachable", `${url} → ${res.status} ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
  return body;
}

/* ─── Discovery and keys, both cached ───
 *
 * Cached because they are asked for on every sign-in and change about once a
 * year. The key cache is also refreshed on demand: a provider may rotate its
 * keys at any moment, and the first token signed by the new one would otherwise
 * fail until the hour was up. That refresh is rate-limited, or an unknown `kid`
 * — which is also what a forged token looks like — would be a way to make this
 * server hammer the provider.
 */
const HOUR = 60 * 60 * 1000;
let discovery = { at: 0, doc: null };
let jwks = { at: 0, keys: [], lastForcedRefresh: 0 };

async function metadata() {
  if (discovery.doc && Date.now() - discovery.at < HOUR) return discovery.doc;
  const doc = await getJson(`${ISSUER}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);
  for (const field of ["authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri"]) {
    if (!doc[field]) throw fail("provider_incomplete", `discovery document has no ${field}`);
  }
  // The issuer identifies the provider and is checked against every token; a
  // document that names someone else is either misconfigured or not theirs.
  if (trimSlash(doc.issuer) !== ISSUER) {
    throw fail("provider_incomplete", `discovery says issuer ${doc.issuer}, configured ${ISSUER}`);
  }
  discovery = { at: Date.now(), doc };
  return doc;
}

async function signingKeys({ force = false } = {}) {
  const fresh = Date.now() - jwks.at < HOUR;
  if (jwks.keys.length && fresh && !force) return jwks.keys;
  if (force && Date.now() - jwks.lastForcedRefresh < 60_000) return jwks.keys;
  if (force) jwks.lastForcedRefresh = Date.now();
  const doc = await metadata();
  const body = await getJson(doc.jwks_uri);
  const keys = Array.isArray(body.keys) ? body.keys : [];
  jwks = { ...jwks, at: Date.now(), keys };
  return keys;
}

/* ─── Pending sign-ins and one-time tickets ───
 *
 * Both live in memory on purpose. They exist for seconds, they are worthless
 * afterwards, and writing them to the database would mean a table to clean up
 * for something a restart is allowed to lose: a sign-in interrupted by a
 * restart simply starts again.
 */
const PENDING_TTL = 10 * 60 * 1000;
const TICKET_TTL = 60 * 1000;
const pending = new Map(); // state -> { verifier, nonce, at }
const tickets = new Map(); // ticket -> { payload, at }

setInterval(() => {
  const now = Date.now();
  for (const [k, v] of pending) if (now - v.at > PENDING_TTL) pending.delete(k);
  for (const [k, v] of tickets) if (now - v.at > TICKET_TTL) tickets.delete(k);
}, 60_000).unref();

/**
 * Where to send the browser, and what to remember while it is away.
 *
 * PKCE as well as the secret: the code comes back through the browser, and a
 * code that can be redeemed by whoever grabs it is worth as much as the token
 * it buys. `state` ties the return to this attempt, `nonce` ties the ID token to
 * it — different attacks, both cheap to prevent.
 */
async function beginLogin() {
  const doc = await metadata();
  const state = randomId();
  const nonce = randomId();
  const verifier = randomId();
  const challenge = b64url(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest());
  pending.set(state, { verifier, nonce, at: Date.now() });

  const url = new URL(doc.authorization_endpoint);
  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries({
    response_type: "code",
    client_id: CLIENT_ID,
    redirect_uri: REDIRECT_URI,
    scope: SCOPES,
    state,
    nonce,
    code_challenge: challenge,
    code_challenge_method: "S256",
  })) {
    url.searchParams.set(k, v);
  }
  return url.toString();
}

/** The signature, then the claims. Everything here is a reason to refuse. */
async function verifyIdToken(idToken, nonce) {
  const parts = String(idToken).split(".");
  if (parts.length !== 3) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "not three parts");
  const [headerB64, payloadB64, signatureB64] = parts;

  let header, claims;
  try {
    header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(headerB64, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
    claims = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payloadB64, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
  } catch {
    throw fail("id_token_invalid", "header or payload is not JSON");
  }

  const ALGORITHMS = {
    RS256: { hash: "sha256" },
    RS384: { hash: "sha384" },
    RS512: { hash: "sha512" },
    PS256: { hash: "sha256", padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, saltLength: 32 },
    ES256: { hash: "sha256", dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" },
    ES384: { hash: "sha384", dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" },
  };
  const alg = ALGORITHMS[header.alg];
  // `none` is a valid JWT algorithm and an unforgeable way in if it is honoured.
  if (!alg) throw fail("id_token_invalid", `unsupported algorithm ${header.alg}`);

  const pick = (keys) =>
    keys.find((k) => (header.kid ? k.kid === header.kid : true) && (!k.use || k.use === "sig"));

  const attempt = async (force) => {
    const jwk = pick(await signingKeys({ force }));
    if (!jwk) return `no signing key for kid ${header.kid}`;
    try {
      const key = crypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" });
      const ok = crypto.verify(
        alg.hash,
        Buffer.from(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`),
        {
          key,
          ...(alg.padding ? { padding: alg.padding, saltLength: alg.saltLength } : {}),
          ...(alg.dsaEncoding ? { dsaEncoding: alg.dsaEncoding } : {}),
        },
        Buffer.from(signatureB64, "base64url")
      );
      return ok ? null : "signature does not match";
    } catch (e) {
      return `signature check failed: ${e.message}`;
    }
  };

  /* Once with what we have, and if that fails once more with the key set read
   * fresh. A provider may add a key, or replace one without renaming it, and
   * either way the first token signed with it would otherwise be refused until
   * the cached hour was up. The re-read is rate-limited inside `signingKeys`, so
   * a stream of forged tokens cannot turn this into a way to hammer them. */
  const problem = (await attempt(false)) && (await attempt(true));
  if (problem) throw fail("id_token_invalid", problem);

  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
  const SKEW = 120; // clocks on two machines are never quite the same
  const audiences = Array.isArray(claims.aud) ? claims.aud : [claims.aud];
  if (trimSlash(claims.iss) !== ISSUER) throw fail("id_token_invalid", `issued by ${claims.iss}`);
  if (!audiences.includes(CLIENT_ID)) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "not addressed to this client");
  if (audiences.length > 1 && claims.azp !== CLIENT_ID) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "azp is someone else");
  if (!claims.exp || claims.exp + SKEW < now) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "expired");
  if (claims.iat && claims.iat - SKEW > now) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "issued in the future");
  // The nonce is what makes this token *this* sign-in rather than one replayed
  // from somewhere else.
  if (claims.nonce !== nonce) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "nonce does not match");
  if (!claims.sub) throw fail("id_token_invalid", "no subject");

  return claims;
}

/**
 * The return leg: state back to a pending attempt, code to tokens, token to
 * claims. Gives back only what an account is made of.
 */
async function completeLogin({ code, state }) {
  if (!code || !state) throw fail("callback_incomplete");
  const attempt = pending.get(state);
  // One attempt, one use — a code replayed with the same state gets nowhere.
  pending.delete(state);
  if (!attempt) throw fail("state_unknown", "no pending sign-in for this state, or it expired");

  const doc = await metadata();
  const body = new URLSearchParams({
    grant_type: "authorization_code",
    code,
    redirect_uri: REDIRECT_URI,
    client_id: CLIENT_ID,
    client_secret: CLIENT_SECRET,
    code_verifier: attempt.verifier,
  });
  let tokens;
  try {
    tokens = await getJson(doc.token_endpoint, {
      method: "POST",
      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", Accept: "application/json" },
      body: body.toString(),
    });
  } catch (e) {
    throw fail("token_exchange_failed", e.message);
  }
  if (!tokens.id_token) throw fail("token_exchange_failed", "no id_token in the response");

  const claims = await verifyIdToken(tokens.id_token, attempt.nonce);
  return {
    sub: String(claims.sub),
    username: claims.preferred_username || null,
    email: claims.email || null,
    displayName: claims.name || claims.given_name || null,
  };
}

/* ─── The ticket the browser carries home ─── */

function issueTicket(payload) {
  const ticket = randomId();
  tickets.set(ticket, { payload, at: Date.now() });
  return ticket;
}

/** Single use: redeemed or gone, so a ticket left in a URL is worth nothing twice. */
function redeemTicket(ticket) {
  const entry = tickets.get(String(ticket ?? ""));
  if (!entry) return null;
  tickets.delete(String(ticket));
  if (Date.now() - entry.at > TICKET_TTL) return null;
  return entry.payload;
}

module.exports = {
  enabled,
  label: LABEL,
  issuer: ISSUER,
  redirectUri: REDIRECT_URI,
  appUrl: APP_URL,
  describeConfiguration,
  beginLogin,
  completeLogin,
  issueTicket,
  redeemTicket,
};