The password tab was hidden for accounts with no password, which is not the
same as accounts that sign in through the provider — an account linked to one
kept its password and therefore kept the tab. That is precisely the account
the person setting this up is using. It goes by "signs in over there" now; the
password it kept is the emergency door, set by an administrator.
And the picture. The provider sends one, the server fetches it at each
sign-in and stores it encrypted in a table beside the users rather than in
them, and serves it back through the API — so the page never talks to the
provider, no third-party cookie is needed for a face to appear, and it
survives the provider being down like everything else here. Fetched once per
account into an object URL, since an img tag cannot carry a bearer token.
The suite's provider now serves a picture too, and the check asks the browser
whether it actually decoded rather than whether the element exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Has an identity at the provider" and "has no password here" are two
different questions, and the interface was answering the second while being
asked the first: an account that existed before and was linked — the usual
case for whoever sets this up — carried no mark at all in the administration
list.
The server now reports both. The list marks every linked account, says which
of them have no password, and offers to give one rather than to reset
something that is not there. The account panel names the provider it signs in
through, which is also the missing explanation for the password tab that
disappeared.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenID Connect, off unless four settings are present. It is a second way to
the same token the password login mints — every route and the WebSocket
still know only a signed JWT — which is why it fits in one file and needs no
new dependency: Node imports a JWK itself, so checking an ID token is a
signature and five claims.
Authorization Code with PKCE, exchanged on the server so the client secret
stays there. The browser comes home with a one-time ticket rather than the
token, because a token in a redirect URL sits in the history, in the proxy's
log and in the referrer of the next request.
Somebody the app has not seen gets an account; an account that already
exists under that name is linked to the identity rather than duplicated, by
subject from then on. Never an administrator. An account made this way has
no password here, and the interface stops offering one — but an admin can
still set one, which is the way back in if the provider is ever gone.
The suite signs in at a provider of its own that signs real RS256 tokens,
and holds down the four ways the journey must fail as well as the way it
must work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
